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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the effect of globalization on subjective well-being by 
using a dataset that combines micro- and macro-level variables for the EU-15 
countries from 1975 to 2000. The estimations provide evidence that - in line 
with theoretical predictions - globalization has benefited especially high-
skilled workers, right-wing voters, and people in the highest income quartile. 
On the other hand, globalization has increased well-being to a higher extent 
for old people than for young people. 
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1.Introduction 
The economic literature provides evidence that globalization is beneficial in terms of 
macroeconomic performance (Dreher, 2006) and increasing product variety (Broda and Weinstein, 
2006), while income inequality between (Dutt and Mukhopadhyay, 2005) and within countries 
(Dreher and Gaston, 2008) has been exacerbated in a globalized world. At the same time, there is a 
growing literature investigating the effect of country-level variables on individuals’ subjective well-
being (Di Tella et al. 2001; Frey and Stutzer, 2002). However, the question of who are 
globalization’s winners and losers in terms of well-being has so far only been analyzed in one cross-
country study (Bjørnskov et al., 2007), while the results of this analysis are of limited use if 
subjective well-being is not internationally comparable (Diener and Oishi, 2006).1  
 To fill this gap, this paper analyzes the effect of globalization on people’s life satisfaction 
drawing on a rich micro dataset for the EU-15 countries from 1975 to 2000. The analysis suggests 
that globalization has generally contributed to people’s well-being. In addition, skill-level, income, 
political ideology and age represent dimensions that identify the main beneficiaries of globalization. 
 
2.Theoretical considerations and hypotheses 
The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem provides a clear prediction with regard to globalization’s winners and 
losers. It contends that in a world where production factors are mobile across sectors more 
liberalized trade induces changes in relative factor prices according to the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem. More specifically, in developed regions such as the EU-15 countries the prices of 
relatively abundant production factors (high-skilled labor) increase, while those of relatively scare 
production factors (low-skilled labor) decrease. Hence, due to this change in relative wages the 
well-being of high-skilled workers increases more than that of low-skilled workers (hypothesis 1).2 
O’Rourke (2006) provides preliminary evidence for this first hypothesis by showing that skill-level 
has a significant influence on voters’ support for globalization. 
 Secondly, people with a higher income should be better able to benefit from the increased 
opportunities for travelling and consumption that globalization offers (hypothesis 2). Thirdly, as 
right-wing voters are generally in support of liberalization, one might suspect that they benefit more 
from globalization than left-wing voters (hypothesis 3). Finally, there is reason to believe that 
globalization’s effect on well-being varies across age groups since young people may be more 
prepared and better able to take advantage of the increased opportunities on the labor market (Doyle 
and Fidrmuc, 2005) (hypothesis 4).  
                                                          
1
 This may also explain why the authors only find a significant effect of globalization in one out of eight estimations. 
2
 We do not assume a decline in the well-being of low-skilled workers because they do benefit from other aspects of 
globalization such as opportunities for travelling and increasing product variety. 
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3. Data description and empirical strategy 
Given the evidence for a negative effect of unemployment and inflation on life satisfaction (Di Tella 
et al. 2001), the estimations include the vector tcMacro representing the growth rate of the consumer 
price index (OECD Key Economic Indicators) and unemployment rates (OECD Economic 
Outlook). In addition, the KOF globalization index (based on data from the political, social and 
economic sphere) appears in the estimations as our main independent variable.3 Finally, the 
regressions take into account micro-level variables from the Eurobarometer Survey Series, where 
itcIndividual includes gender, age, relative income, ideological preferences, marital and employment 
status, education level and the number of children. The dependent variable – life satisfaction – is 
based on the question ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied (4), fairly satisfied (3), not very satisfied 
(2) or not at all satisfied (1) with the life you lead?’. 
The regression model best suited to the analysis in this paper is an ordered response model, 
where the dependent variable is discrete and measured on a finite ordinal scale. The first part of the 
model is a structural equation for the latent, continuous dependent variable:  
 
*
itc itc tc tc t c itcLifesat Individual Globalization Macroα β γ δ ω µ ε= + + + + + +                               (1) 
 
itcε represents an i.i.d. and normally distributed error term and all regressions include an intercept 
α , time fixed effects tω  and country fixed effects cµ . The latter are indispensable since measures 
of subjective well-being may not be internationally comparable.  
 The second part of the model is an observation rule for the ordinal dependent variable, which 
relates the observable dependent variable to the latent variable by spelling out how 
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The ordered response model outlined above is estimated for the following population subgroups: 
 
Unskilled/skilled:  Respondents who at most attended school until the age of 15/ at least 
attended school until the age of 20 
 
Poor/rich:   Respondents in the lowest/ highest income quartile 
 
Left-wing/right-wing: Respondents placing themselves on the left/ right of the ideological scale 
 
Young/old:    Respondents who are at most 30 years old/ older than 50 years 
                                                          
3
 For more details on the KOF index see Dreher (2006). The data can be downloaded at http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. 
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4. Estimation results 
Table 1 displays estimations results for each of the eight subgroups and provides evidence that 
globalization has a significantly positive effect on well-being across all groups. Since the 
magnitudes of the coefficients have no meaningful interpretation in microeconometric estimations, 
we have additionally calculated marginal effects at the independent variables’ means. The 
difference in terms of globalization’s effect on well-being is largest across the ideological 
dimension. To be more exact, when the globalization index increases by one unit, the probability of 
being ‘very satisfied’ with one’s life rises by 0.7 percentage points for left-wing voters and 1.5 
percentage points for right-wing voters. Given that the globalization index ranges from 24.8 to 47.7 
in our sample, we conclude that globalization has an economically significant effect on well-being. 
 The findings for model 7 and 8 provide strong evidence against hypothesis 4 as they suggest 
that old people benefit more from globalization than young people.4 A potential explanation is that 
globalization puts pressure on young people by requiring additional skills from them such as foreign 
languages. Hence, young people may find that the job market offers more opportunities but is also 
more competitive than ever. In addition, it may be difficult for young people to maintain social 
relationships across national borders when studying abroad or taking up an international assignment. 
Summarizing, we cannot reject hypotheses 1 to 3, while we do reject hypothesis 4.   
 
5.Conclusion 
The empirical analysis in this paper suggests that globalization has benefited especially high-skilled 
workers, right-wing voters, and people in the highest income quartile. This implies among other 
things that there is evidence in favor of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. On the other hand, 
globalization has increased well-being to a higher extent for old people than for young people. This 
may be attributed to the fact that a globalized labor market puts pressure on young people in terms 
of the skills that they need to master and due to the difficulty of maintaining social relationships 
across borders. Overall, we find that on the level of population subgroups globalization has only 
created winners in terms of well-being. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 The difference in marginal effects is even larger when redifining the age groups for instance with a cut-off at 45 years or  
with the young defined as below 35 years of age and the old defined as 60 years old or over. 
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Table 1: Ordered probit estimation results for subgroups, 1975 - 2000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Unskilled Skilled Poor Rich Left-wing Right-wing Young Old 
Globalization 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 
 (16.358) (12.043) (10.816) (12.392) (16.682) (10.737) (11.973) (16.832) 
 [0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.015] [0.005] [0.008] 
 
0.001 -0.017*** -0.001 -0.007*** 0.001 -0.016*** -0.007*** 0.001 Unemploy-
ment rate (0.748) (-7.881) (-0.636) (-4.138) (0.918) (-8.765) (-4.041) (0.691) 
 
Inflation rate -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.011*** 
 (-6.711) (-6.855) (-5.319) (-4.784) (-4.142) (-7.885) (-6.376) (-4.418) 
 
Male -0.034*** -0.069*** -0.061*** -0.053*** -0.043*** -0.080*** -0.078*** 0.003 
 (-4.589) (-7.322) (-6.377) (-5.920) (-5.779) (-8.507) (-9.707) (0.345) 
 
Age -0.030*** -0.037*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.028***   
 (-24.266) (-16.824) (-19.617) (-13.206) (-22.190) (-17.348) 
 
  
Age^2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***   
 (25.223) (15.836) (21.256) (12.627) (21.262) (18.020) 
 
  
0.132*** 0.113***   0.133*** 0.130*** 0.103*** 0.129*** Relative 
income (39.864) (25.094)   (37.832) (31.712) (28.141) (33.334) 
 
0.091*** 0.105*** 0.079*** 0.094***   0.099*** 0.088*** Ideological 
preferences (21.522) (18.315) (13.776) (17.252)   (19.495) (17.846) 
Marital status        
Married 0.119*** 0.185*** 0.118*** 0.191*** 0.140*** 0.137*** 0.122*** 0.074*** 
 (10.457) (13.977) (9.272) (12.324) (12.896) (9.898) (12.709) (4.817) 
 
Divorced -0.251*** -0.185*** -0.271*** -0.158*** -0.182*** -0.260*** -0.386*** -0.229*** 
 (-12.553) (-7.139) (-14.062) (-4.390) (-9.467) (-9.927) (-10.655) (-10.206) 
 
Separated -0.315*** -0.232*** -0.306*** -0.271*** -0.189*** -0.371*** -0.299*** -0.321*** 
 (-10.022) (-5.328) (-9.707) (-4.951) (-6.191) (-8.752) (-6.649) (-8.029) 
 
Widowed -0.124*** -0.145*** -0.111*** -0.221*** -0.119*** -0.134*** -0.238** -0.087*** 
 (-7.972) (-4.539) (-6.648) (-6.254) (-6.001) (-6.194) (-2.474) (-5.139) 
Employment status        
Unemployed -0.531*** -0.537*** -0.583*** -0.515*** -0.543*** -0.530*** -0.517*** -0.495*** 
 (-38.721) (-24.249) (-37.223) (-19.527) (-38.909) (-26.310) (-36.740) (-22.903) 
 
School 0.118*** 0.020 0.113*** 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.120*** 0.185*** -0.048 
 (5.029) (1.246) (6.198) (4.754) (5.660) (6.278) (18.467) (-0.375) 
 
Retired 0.015 -0.027 -0.074*** 0.022 -0.005 0.035** -0.232*** 0.127*** 
 (1.254) (-1.140) (-4.524) (0.977) (-0.314) (2.069) (-3.137) (12.513) 
 
Home 0.015 0.053*** -0.086*** 0.070*** 0.003 0.033** -0.036** 0.074*** 
 (1.458) (2.930) (-5.379) (4.598) (0.264) (2.372) (-2.511) (5.354) 
 
-0.024** 0.006 -0.078*** 0.008 0.027* -0.047*** 0.039** -0.029* Self-
employed (-2.113) (0.365) (-4.105) (0.614) (1.926) (-3.455) (2.245) (-1.929) 
Education till age        
16 to 19 yrs   0.081*** 0.126*** 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.067*** 0.082*** 
   (7.181) (11.286) (9.218) (8.170) (6.468) (8.783) 
 
> 19 yrs   0.148*** 0.191*** 0.139*** 0.176*** 0.084*** 0.140*** 
   (9.984) (15.597) (13.497) (14.418) (7.015) (11.433) 
Number of children <= 15 years       
1 -0.071*** -0.006 -0.026* -0.009 -0.030*** -0.023* -0.023** -0.151*** 
 (-6.836) (-0.464) (-1.754) (-0.743) (-2.820) (-1.763) (-2.050) (-8.618) 
 
2 -0.050*** -0.005 0.008 0.009 -0.018 0.007 -0.068*** -0.079*** 
 (-4.482) (-0.347) (0.469) (0.675) (-1.578) (0.469) (-5.260) (-3.752) 
 
>= 3 -0.099*** 0.003 -0.080*** 0.021 -0.033** -0.062*** -0.096*** -0.158*** 
 (-7.203) (0.145) (-3.686) (1.248) (-2.257) (-3.576) (-5.542) (-6.360) 
Observations 132,278 71,722 70,777 80,759 111,370 82,257 93,858 96,300 
[1] Hypothesis tests are based on robust standard errors  [2] t-statistics are in parentheses  [3] Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) , 1% (***)             
[4] Marginal effects at means of independent variables in square brackets and bold letters 
[5] Base levels for dummy variables: female, single, education till age < 15 years, employed, no children <= 15 years 
[6] Ideological preferences: -1 (left-wing), 0 (center), +1 (right wing) / Relative income: 1 (lowest income quartile) to 4 (highest quartile) 
[7] The numbers of observations for each of the four dimensions do not add up to the total of 319,703 since medium-skilled workers,  
 medium-income earners, people with a centrist ideology and medium-aged people are not considered in the analysis 
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